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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the information-
theoretic security by modeling a cognitive radio wiretap chan-
nel under quality-of-service (QoS) constraints and interference
power limitations inflicted on primary users (PUs). We initially
define four different transmission scenarios regarding channel
sensing results and their correctness. We provide effective secure
transmission rates at which a secondary eavesdropper is refrained
from listening to a secondary transmitter (ST). Then, we con-
struct a channel state transition diagram that characterizes this
channel model. We obtain the effective secure capacity which
describes the maximum constant buffer arrival rate under given
QoS constraints. We find out the optimal transmission power
policies that maximize the effective secure capacity, and then,
we propose an algorithm that, in general, converges quickly to
these optimal policy values. Finally, we show the performance
levels and gains obtained under different channel conditions and
scenarios. And, we emphasize, in particular, the significant effect
of hidden-terminal problem on information-theoretic security in
cognitive radios.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, effective capacity, quality of
service (QoS) constraints, information-theoretic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its spreading nature, security in wireless communica-
tions has become an important scrutiny for a long time, and it
has been analyzed from several research perspectives including
Information Theory [1]. In the earliest information-theoretic
study conducted by Shannon [2], the wiretap channel in which
a transmitter communicates with a legitimate receiver with
the presence of an eavesdropper was characterized [1]. Con-
sidering the wiretap channel, Wyner [3] showed that secure
transmission to a legitimate destination can be achieved, and
he defined secrecy capacity as the highest reliable rate from
the transmitter to the legitimate receiver while keeping the
eavesdropper completely puzzled about the transmitted signal.
Following these studies, there have been recently a large num-
ber of investigations addressing information-theoretic security
under various conditions in different channel models [4]-[7].
For instance, secure communications and secrecy capacity in
fading channels have been studied in [4] and [5].
Meanwhile, on the grounds of randomness and fluctuations
in wireless environment, not only security but also quality-
of-service (QoS) regarding delay and buffer constraints has
been considered as a vital performance metric. Accordingly,
effective capacity [8] as a dual of effective bandwidth [9] has
attracted a remarkable focus as it has identified the maximum
constant arrival rate that a given time-varying service process
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can support while meeting QoS requirements. Subsequently,
the authors in [10]-[14] meticulously researched effective
capacity in several contexts. For example, it was investigated
in cognitive radios under interference power limitations while
regarding channel sensing results [13] and in cognitive radio
relay channels under average and peak power constraints [14].
During the time the ever-increasing demand for higher data
rates with stringent QoS requirements is inevitably leading
to highly intense spectrum occupancy, cognitive radio has
emerged as a solution to ameliorate spectrum inefficiency,
and to provide better QoS. Since then, several complex
transmission scenarios have been proposed and analyzed, i.e.,
cooperative strategies for cognitive radio networks attracted
significant attention [15]. With the growing multiplicity, se-
curity challenges have become more sophisticated and multi-
directional in different aspects [16]. Specifically, as a substance
of information-theoretic security in cognitive radios, the out-
age probability of secrecy capacity of a primary user (PU)
from a theoretical point of view has been studied [17], and the
relationship between multiple-input multiple-output channel
secrecy rate and the cognitive radios under interference power
constraints has been examined [18].
In this paper, different than the aforementioned studies,
we investigate the information-theoretic security of secondary
users (SUs) in cognitive radio wiretap channels where SUs
detect the activities of PUs imperfectly, and then perform data
transmission under QoS and interference power constraints.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In
Section II, we describe the cognitive radio wiretap channel
model, and define the interference power constraints con-
sidering channel sensing errors. In Section III, we provide
the instantaneous secrecy capacities that depend on channel
sensing results and channel fading parameters. Furthermore,
we identify channel states, and establish the effective secure
capacity in Section IV, and obtain the optimal transmission
power policies that maximize this capacity in Section V.
Finally, we present the numerical results in Section VI, and
we summarize our achievements in Section VII.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND POWER CONSTRAINTS
A. Channel Model
As shown in Figure 1, we consider a setting in which a
single secondary transmitter, denoted by ST, performs commu-
nications with two secondary receivers (SRs) in the presence of
possibly multiple PUs. We assume that ST sends confidential
messages to one of the SRs, which is denoted by SRm. In
Fig. 1: Cognitive radio wiretap channel model.
this perspective, the other SR, which is denoted by SRe,
can be considered as an eavesdropper. Nevertheless, it is not
necessarily a malicious one in our case as it abides by the
protocols and regulations. We can consider this scenario as a
part of a larger scenario in which ST sends both confidential
and common messages to both SRs at different time intervals
in the long-run. We further assume that the PUs are not aware
of the coding strategies of the SUs.
In the above model, the generated data sequences are
initially stored in the data buffer, and then transmitted by ST
in frames of T seconds over the wireless channel. During the
data transmission, the channel input-output relations at the jth
time instant are
ym(j) = hm(j)x(j)+nm(j) +sm(j), (1)
ye(j) = he(j)x(j) +ne(j) +se(j), (2)
if the PUs are active, and
ym(j) = hm(j)x(j)+nm(j), (3)
ye(j) = he(j)x(j) +ne(j), for j = 1, 2, ..., (4)
if the PUs are absent. Above, x(j) denotes the complex-valued
channel input, and ym(j) is the complex-valued channel output
at SRm, while ye(j) is the complex-valued channel output at
SRe. In (1) and (3), hm(j) represents the fading coefficient
between ST and SRm, and in (2) and (4), he(j) represents the
fading coefficient between ST and SRe. They both are assumed
to be zero-mean, circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian
distributed random variables with variances E{|hm(j)|2} =
E{zm(j)} = σ2m and E{|he(j)|2} = E{ze(j)} = σ2e . Note
that zm(j) and ze(j) are the magnitude squares of instanta-
neous fading coefficients. In the above equations, {nm(j)}
and {ne(j)} are sequences of additive thermal random noise
samples at SRm and SRe, that are also zero-mean, circu-
larly symmetric, complex Gaussian distributed with variances
E{|nm(j)|2} = σ2nm and E{|ne(j)|2} = σ2ne, respectively.
In (1) and (2), sm(j) arriving at SRm and se(j) arriving
at SRe denote the active PUs’ faded signals. We show the
average power levels of sm(j) and se(j) with σ2sm and σ2se,
respectively.
We further consider a block-fading channel model, and
assume that the fading coefficients stay constant for a frame
duration of T seconds, and change independently from one
frame to another. Besides, we also assume that the activities
of the PUs stay the same in each frame, and that they have
likewise an independent activity state change from one frame
to another. We remark that the PUs exist with probability ρ
in each frame. Meanwhile, ST, SRm, and SRe experience the
interference caused by the PUs contemporaneously when the
PUs are active, but not at the same average power level. We
finally express that the available bandwidth is B, and so is the
symbol rate assumed to be B complex symbols per second.
B. Interference Power Constraints
Initially, the SUs perform channel sensing to verify the
activities of the PUs, and then, depending on the channel
sensing results, they choose their transmission power policies.
In more detail, if the channel is sensed to be busy, ST
sends data with an instantaneous power policy of Pb(j),
whereas, if the channel is sensed as idle, it sends with an
instantaneous power policy of Pi(j). Additionally, we consider
a practical scenario in which channel sensing errors such as
miss-detections and false alarms possibly occur. Hence, we
denote the correct-detection probability by Pd which is the
probability of declaring the channel as busy while the channel
is actually busy, and the false alarm probability by Pf which
is the probability of declaring the channel as busy while the
channel is actually idle. Here, the busy state indicates that
the PUs are active, and the idle state indicates that there
is not any active PU in the transmission environment. We
further notice that as a result of channel sensing errors, ST
deploys policies Pb(j) and Pi(j) with probabilities Pd and
(1− Pd), respectively, given that the PUs are actually active.
Therefore, the power interference constraint is imposed on not
only Pb(j) but also Pi(j). Thus, the combined interference
power constraint is given as
PdE{Pb(j)} + (1− Pd)E{Pi(j)} 6 Pint (5)
where the expectation E{·} is taken with respect to the fading
coefficients zm and ze, and Pint is the average power interfer-
ence constraint1. Now, let µb(j) = Pb(j)Pint and µi(j) =
Pi(j)
Pint
be
the transmission power policies normalized over Pint. Hence,
we can rewrite (5) as follows:
PdE{µb(j)}+ (1− Pd)E{µi(j)} 6 1. (6)
Since, the average transmission power of ST is limited by
Pint, we define the following signal-to-noise ratio at SRm as
SNR = PintBσ2
nm
.
III. SECRECY RATES
Initially, we consider four different transmission scenarios
regarding the channel sensing decision and its correctness:
1) Channel is busy, detected as busy (correct detection),
2) Channel is busy, detected as idle (miss-detection),
1
Pint is considered as the average power interference constraint normalized
over average fading power and path loss of the channel between ST and the
PRs.
2
3) Channel is idle, detected as busy (false alarm),
4) Channel is idle, detected as idle (correct detection).
We can easily see that ST will send data with the power policy
µb(j) in Scenarios 1 and 3, and µi(j) in Scenarios 2 and 4.
Hence, assuming the interference caused by the PUs, sm(j)
and se(j), as additional Gaussian noise, the instantaneous
secure channel capacities in the above four scenarios are
expressed as
Ck(j) =
[
B log2 (1 + ζm,k(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cmk(j)
−B log2 (1 + ζe,k(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cek(j)
]+
bits/s for k = {1, 2, 3, 4}, (7)
where
ζm,1(j) =
zm(j)SNRµb(j)
β
, ζe,1(j) =
ze(j)αbSNRµb(j)
β
,
ζm,2(j) =
zm(j)SNRµi(j)
β
, ζe,2(j) =
ze(j)αbSNRµi(j)
β
,
ζm,3(j) = zm(j)SNRµb(j), ζe,3(j) = ze(j)αiSNRµb(j),
ζm,4(j) = zm(j)SNRµi(j), ζe,4(j) = ze(j)αiSNRµi(j).
Above, αb = σ
2
nm
+σ2
sm
σ2
ne
+σ2
se
, β = 1 +
σ2
sm
σ2
nm
, αi =
σ2
nm
σ2
ne
, and
[a]+ = max(0, a). We observe that the first expression in
the right-hand-side of the above equation, Cmk(j), is in fact
the instantaneous channel capacity between ST and SRm, and
the second expression, Cek(j), is the instantaneous channel
capacity between ST and SRe. It is clearly seen that when
Cek(j) is greater than or equal to Cmk(j), the instantaneous
secure channel capacity will be zero. Therefore, when the
channel of SRe is stronger than the channel of SRm, ST is
not required to transmit any secret data to SRm (i.e., when
ze(j)αb ≥ zm(j), µb(j) = 0 in Scenario 1 and µi(j) = 0 in
Scenario 2, and when ze(j)αi ≥ zm(j), µb(j) = 0 in Scenario
3 and µi(j) = 0 in Scenario 4.).
Now, let rb(j) and ri(j) denote the secure transmission
rates, and let rbe(j) and rie(j) denote the confusion rates,
when the channel is sensed as busy and idle, respectively.
Hence, when the channel of SRm is stronger than the channel
of SRe, we assume that with a secure transmission rate lower
than or equal to the instantaneous secure channel capacity
(i.e., rb(j) ≤ C1(j) and rb(j) ≤ C3(j) in Scenarios 1 and
3, respectively, and ri(j) ≤ C2(j) and ri(j) ≤ C4(j) in
Scenarios 2 and 4, respectively), and a confusion rate greater
than or equal to the instantaneous channel capacity between
ST and SRe (i.e., rbe(j) ≥ C1e(j) and rbe(j) ≥ C3e(j) in
Scenarios 1 and 3, respectively, and rie(j) ≥ C2e(j) and
rie(j) ≥ C4e(j) in Scenarios 2 and 4, respectively), ST will
be able to reliably transmit data to SRm without revealing any
information to SRe as long as the sum of secure transmission
and confusion rates is smaller than the channel capacity
between ST and SRm (i.e., C1m(j) ≥ rbm(j) = rb(j)+rbe(j)
and C3m(j) ≥ rbm(j) in Scenarios 1 and 3, respectively, and
C2m(j) ≥ rim(j) = ri(j) + rie(j) and C4m(j) ≥ rim(j) in
Scenarios 2 and 4, respectively). In this case, SRm will be
able to decode both the confusion and secure data, but SRe
will be blinded by the confusion data and unable to decode
the secure data.
Since the SUs rely on the channel sensing results, and ST
knows both channel fading coefficients, and the SRs know
their corresponding channel fading coefficients, one of the best
transmission strategies could be that when the PUs are detected
as active, the instantaneous secure transmission rate in one
frame is
rb(j) = C1(j)
=
[
B log2 (1 + ζm,1(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
rbm(j)=Cm1(j)
−B log2 (1 + ζe,1(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
rbe(j)=Ce1(j)
]+ bits/s,
and that when the PUs are detected as idle, it is
ri(j) = C4(j)
=
[
B log2 (1 + ζm,4(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
rim(j)=Cm4(j)
−B log2 (1 + ζe,4(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
rie(j)=Ce4(j)
]+ bits/s.
Therefore, we have the instantaneous secure transmission rates
rb(j) equal to C1(j) in Scenarios 1 and 3, and ri(j) equal to
C4(j) in Scenarios 2 and 4. It is clearly seen that in Scenarios
1 and 4, since the sum of secure transmission rate and
confusion rate is equal to the instantaneous channel capacity
between ST and SRm (i.e., rbm(j) = rb(j)+rbe(j) = Cm1(j)
and rim(j) = ri(j) + rie(j) = Cm4(j)), and since the
instantaneous confusion rate is equal to the instantaneous
channel capacity between ST and SRe (i.e., rbe(j) = Ce1(j)
and rie(j) = Ce4(j)), there will be no transmission and
security outages, and a reliable and secure communication
will be provided. As a result, the effective secure transmission
rate in one frame is Trb(j) in Scenario 1, and Tri(j) in
Scenario 4. On the other hand, in Scenarios 2 and 3, we
do have different situations. For instance, rim(j) > Cm2(j)
in Scenario 2. Therefore, no reliable communication will
be performed because SRm will not be able to decode the
confusion and transmitted data, and as a result the effective
secure transmission rate is zero. It is, thence, assumed that a
simple automatic repeat request mechanism is invoked in order
to ensure that erroneous data is retransmitted. In addition,
we observe that rie(j) > Ce2(j). Correspondingly, SRe will
not be able to decode the transmitted data intended for SRm
too. Therefore, there is no security outage in this scenario as
well. However, we see that rbm(j) < Cm3(j) in Scenario 3,
which means that SRm will be able to decode the confusion
and transmitted data. At the same time, we also mark that
rbe(j) < Ce3(j). Particularly, the confusion created by ST
has a smaller rate than the required value, Ce3(j). Therefore,
it is also likely that SRe can decode the transmitted data
especially when zeβαi ≥ zm (i.e., Ce3(j) ≥ rbm(j)), which
will jeopardize the secrecy of the transmitted data. Therefore,
in order to guarantee the information-theoretic security, we
propose the following transmission rate policy when PUs are
detected as active:
rb(j) =
[
B log2 (1 + ζm,1(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
rbm(j)=Cm1(j)
−B log2 (1 + ζe,3(j))︸ ︷︷ ︸
rbe(j)=Ce3(j)
]+ bits/s.
Now, when the channel is detected as busy while zm(j) >
ze(j)βαi, the security will always be provided in Scenario 1,
3
Fig. 2: State transition diagram.
because SRe will not be able to decode the transmitted data
since rbe(j) > Ce1(j). Meanwhile, the security in Scenario
3 will also be provided, because rbe(j) = Ce3(j). Note that
SRm will securely decode its data since Cm1(j) = rbm(j) and
Cm3(j) > rbm(j) in Scenarios 1 and 3, respectively.
IV. EFFECTIVE SECURE CAPACITY
In this section, having characterized the instantaneous se-
cure transmission rates, we investigate the secure throughput
for the aforementioned fading cognitive radio wiretap channel
under statistical QoS constraints. In [8], the authors defined
effective capacity as the maximum constant arrival rate that
a given service process can support in order to guarantee a
desired statistical QoS specified with the QoS exponent θ.
Defining Q as the stationary queue length and θ as the decay
rate of the tail distribution of the queue length Q, we can
express the following:
lim
q→∞
log Pr(Q ≥ q)
q
= −θ. (8)
Therefore, we have the following approximation for larger
q: Pr(Q ≥ q) ≈ e−θq, which means that larger θ refers
to strict buffer constraints, and smaller θ implies looser con-
straints. Furthermore, it is shown in [10] that Pr(D ≥ d) ≤
c
√
Pr(Q ≥ q) for constant arrival rates, where D denotes the
steady-state delay experienced in the buffer, and c is a positive
constant. In the above formulation, q = ad where a is the
source arrival rate. Therefore, effective capacity can provide
us the maximum arrival rate when the system is subject to the
statistical queue length or delay constraints in the forms of
Pr(Q ≥ q) ≤ e−θq or Pr(D ≥ d) ≤ ce−θad/2, respectively.
The effective capacity for a given QoS exponent θ is given
by
− lim
t→∞
1
θt
loge E{e−θS(t)} =
Λ(−θ)
θ
(9)
where S(t) =
∑t
l=1 r(l) is the time-accumulated service
process, and r(l) for l = 1, 2, ... is the discrete-time, stationary
and ergodic stochastic service process. We note that Λ(θ) is
the asymptotic log-moment generating function of S(t), and
is given by
Λ(θ) = lim
t→∞
1
t
logE
{
eθS(t)
}
. (10)
Under block-fading assumption, the securely transmitted
number of bits is Trb(j) or Tri(j) in the lth transmission
frame, if the transmission policy µb(j) or µi(j) is chosen,
respectively, and if the data is transmitted successfully. In
the sequel, since the transmission rate is constant during one
frame, and the channel fading coefficients and the activities
of the PUs change independently from one frame to another,
we will drop the time index j. In the above model, when the
channel is detected as busy in Scenarios 1 and 3, the service
rate is Trb, whereas, when the channel is detected as idle in
Scenario 4, the service rate is Tri in one frame. In Scenario
2, the service rate is zero.
In Figure 2, we display the state transition diagram of the
cognitive radio wiretap channel. On the top-left (Scenario 1)
and top-right (Scenario 3), we see the states in which ST sends
data reliably with a secure transmission rate rb in one frame,
whereas on the lower-right (Scenario 4), we have the state
in which data is transmitted with a secure transmission rate
ri. On the other hand, on the lower-left (Scenario 2), due to
miss-detection when the PUs are active, the effective secure
transmission rate is 0. Moreover, state transition probabilities
are also shown in the figure. For instance, state transition
from any state to State 1 is ρPd. Similarly, state transition
probabilities to States 2, 3, and 4 are ρ(1 − Pd), (1 − ρ)Pf ,
and (1− ρ)(1− Pf ), respectively. This is due to the fact that
the activities of the PUs and the channel fading coefficients
change independently from one frame to another.
Following the steps in [13], we can express the effective
secure capacity, which is the maximum constant arrival rate
of secret data arriving at ST, as
Re(θ) =
−1
θBT
loge E
[
pbe
−θTrb + pie
−θTri + p0
]
bits/s/Hz.
(11)
where pb = ρPd + (1 − ρ)Pf , pi = (1 − ρ)(1 − Pf ), and
p0 = ρ(1 − Pd).
V. OPTIMAL TRANSMISSION POWER CONTROL
After characterizing the effective secure capacity, we turn
our attention to optimal transmission power policies that will
maximize the expression in (11). The following result provides
the optimal power allocation policies.
Theorem 1: The optimal power allocation policies, µb and
µi, that maximize the effective secure capacity are given by
µb =
{
X : X = Hb(X), zm − zeβαi > γ0Pdβpb ,
0, otherwise,
(12)
and
µi =
{
X : X = Hi(X), zm − zeαi > γ0(1−Pd)pi ,
0, otherwise,
(13)
respectively, where
Hb(X) =
(zm − zeβαi)
√
1 + Φ− (zm + zeβαi)
2zmzeαiSNR
, (14)
Hi(X) =
(zm − zeαi)
√
1 + Ψ− (zm + zeαi)
2zmzeαiSNR
, (15)
Φ = 4zmzeαipbf(X)γ0Pd(zm−zeβαi) , Ψ =
4zmzeαipig(X)
γ0(1−Pd)(zm−zeαi)
, f(X) =(
β+zmSNRX
β+zeβαiSNRX
)
−κ
, g(X) =
(
1+zmSNRX
1+zeαiSNRX
)
−κ
, and κ =
θTB
log 2 . γ0 is the power threshold value in the power adaptation
4
policies, and it can be obtained from the average interference
power constraint given in (6) through numerical techniques2.
Now, we can easily find out that (14) and (15) are mono-
tonically decreasing convex functions of X for X ≥ 0, and
Hb(0) and Hi(0) are greater than 0. Therefore, we provide the
following simple algorithm to obtain optimal power policies:
Algorithm 1: Power Control
1: Initialize γ0;
2: if zm − zeβαi ≤ γ0Pdβpb then
3: µb = 0;
4: else
5: Initialize µ0b = 0, µ2b = Hb(0), µ1b = (µ0b + µ2b)/2;
6: while Until µb converges do
7: µb = Hb(µ1b);
8: if µb > µ2b then
9: µ0b = µ
1
b , µ
1
b = (µ
0
b + µ
2
b)/2;
10: else if µb > µ1b then
11: µ0b = µ
1
b , µ
1
b = µ
2
b = µb;
12: else if µb > µ0b then
13: µ2b = µ
1
b , µ
0
b = µ
1
b = µb;
14: else
15: µ2b = µ
1
b , µ
1
b = (µ
0
b + µ
2
b)/2;
16: end if
17: end while
18: end if
19: if zm − zeαi ≤ γ0(1−Pd)pi then
20: µi = 0;
21: else
22: Initialize µ0i = 0, µ2i = Hi(0), µ1i = (µ0i + µ2i )/2;
23: while Until µi converges do
24: µi = Hi(µ1i );
25: ... Follow Steps 8-16 for µi ...;
26: end while
27: end if
28: if (6) is satisfied then
29: Declare µb and µi;
30: else
31: Update γ0 and return to Step 2;
32: end if
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results. Unless
indicated otherwise, we consider the following parameter
values. The channel is assumed to be busy with probability
ρ = 0.1. The noise variances are assumed to be σ2nm = 1 and
σ2ne = 1, and the average power of the PUs’ signals arriving
at the SRs are σ2sm = 1 and σ2se = 1. We further assume that
the fading coefficients have unit variances σ2m = σ2e = 1 in
Rayleigh fading environment. Channel bandwidth is B = 100
Hz, and the frame duration is T = 1 second.
In Figure 3, we demonstrate the performance of Algorithm
1 under different channel conditions and QoS requirements.
In the upper part of the figure, we display the probability
distribution of number of iterations required for convergence
2We note that when ze = 0, the transmitter does not need to consider the
above policies since there is no direct link to SRe. In such a case, security is
guaranteed at any value of zm.
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Fig. 3: Probability distribution of the number of iterations
required for Algorithm 1 to converge to the solution.
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Fig. 4: Maximized effective secure capacity vs. QoS exponent
θ for different values of Pf and Pd.
for different values of Pf and Pd when SNR = 10 dB and QoS
exponent θ = 1. We notice that channel sensing performance
do not affect the required number of iterations. The required
number of iterations is often less than 14. On the other hand,
in the lower part of the figure, we observe that while the
value of θ has an impact on the speed of the algorithm, SNR
does not have any effect. With decreasing θ (less strict QoS
requirements), the number of iterations also decreases. For
instance, when θ = 0.01, mostly with less than 5 iterations,
the algorithm converges to the solution.
In Figure 4, we plot the effective secure capacity as a
function of θ for different Pf and Pd values when SNR = 10
dB. As expected, effective secure capacity increases with
decreasing θ, and better channel sensing performance enhances
the transmission throughput, e.g., Pf = 0.1 and Pd = 0.9.
We interestingly note that the gains attained through boosting
channel sensing performance tend to diminish with increasing
θ. In Figure 5, we plot the effective secure capacity as a
function of SNR for different channel sensing results when
θ = 0.1. We point out that effective secure capacity does not
escalate with the looser interference power constraints after
certain SNR(Pint) value. In contrast to results in Fig. 4, we
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Fig. 6: Maximized effective secure capacity vs. β for different
Pf , Pd, and SNR values when θ = 0.01.
see that channel sensing performance has a considerable effect
in transmission throughput.
We recall that β = 1 + σ
2
sm
σ2
nm
is the interference plus
noise-to-noise ratio at SRm which can be considered as an
important parameter that will help us analyze the effects of
hidden-terminal problem3 in cognitive radio wiretap channels.
We know that the minimum value of β is 1. In Figure 6,
we plot the effective secure capacity vs. β. We observe that
channel sensing results have a crucial role in the transmission
throughput. Although the PUs have strong signal power, they
may not be detected due to hidden-terminal effects. Therefore,
Pd might be very low. In order to increase Pd, the SUs may
be required to increase the false alarm probability, Pf . As
a result, even with high SNR, when β has a considerable
value the transmission throughput may be lower than the
throughput obtained with low SNR while having better channel
sensing results. This is due to increased Pf . For instance, when
Pf = 0.5, Pd = 0.9 and SNR = 0 dB, the effective secure
capacity is lower than the effective secure capacity obtained
when Pf = 0.1, Pd = 0.9 and SNR = −10 when β is high.
3Hidden-terminal or hidden-node problem occurs when PUs’ signals are
seen from a SU but not other SUs that communicate with that SU.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the effective secure capacity
in cognitive radio wiretap channels in order to investigate inter-
actions among information-theoretic security, channel sensing
performance and QoS requirements. We have initially con-
structed channel scenarios, and have provided instantaneous
secure channel capacities in each scenario. We have estab-
lished transmission strategies regarding channel sensing results
and channel fading coefficients. We have acquired optimal
transmission power policies, and have provided the algorithm
that ascertains these policy values as a function of channel
fading coefficients, channel sensing results, interference power
constraints and QoS requirements. Finally, we have presented
numerical results, and have highlighted the consequences of
hidden-terminal on effective secure capacity.
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